The attorney general is a public officer who has been given ample discretionary power under Article 145 of the Federal Constitution to institute, conduct or discontinue any criminal proceedings. The question is, where a public officer's decision is subject to judicial review, does this equally apply to the attorney general?
The Federal Court recently reaffirmed that where a final court order is proved to be null and void on grounds of illegality or due to a lack of jurisdiction, the court has inherent jurisdiction to set aside the order, even in the absence of an express enabling provision. However, is the rule different for winding-up orders?
Following a recent Court of Appeal decision on staying proceedings pending appeal, the test as to whether a stay ought to be granted under Section 44 of the Courts of Judicature Act has been simplified (ie, it now focuses on whether the true purpose of the stay is to preserve the integrity of the appeal). The new threshold to obtain a stay is considerably lower than that of the special circumstances rule under Section 73 of the Courts of Judicature Act.
A recent Federal Court decision has simply reaffirmed the position of Malaysian law in relation to breaches of trust. The majority of the Federal Court held that imputed constructive knowledge of an assignment is insufficient to hold the debtor liable to the assignee for the debt. The decision also illustrates a disinclination to depart from the established law on the requirement of dishonesty in a breach of trust.
Section 126 of the Evidence Act 1950 imposes a legal obligation on all solicitors to protect and keep confidential any information obtained from their clients, including any legal advice that has been proffered. However, as much as the importance of this privilege is understood and embraced, it may still have come as a surprise when the Federal Court decided that a breach of this privilege by solicitors could entail a legal action against said solicitors.