Unlike EU competition law, Switzerland has no actual state aid regime. However, in the area of air transport, there is an exception. Until now, this provision had little significance in practice. Due to the ongoing downturn in air transport in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and the financial difficulties resulting therefrom, this is now changing and a practice regarding its application and interpretation from a Swiss perspective is being established for the first time.
Parliament is currently debating the so-called 'fair price initiative' and an indirect counter-proposal by the government, both of which aim to tighten the Cartel Act. Among other new provisions, the concept of relative market power will be introduced to combat foreclosure of the Swiss market and price discrimination against Swiss corporate customers. Both chambers of Parliament have agreed that the concept of relative market power will apply not only to suppliers, but also to customers.
Under Swiss competition law, a proposed concentration may trigger a mandatory pre-merger notification obligation if one of the undertakings concerned has been held to be dominant, irrespective of the statutory turnover thresholds. The scope of this provision is controversial. The Federal Administrative Court has now adopted a broad interpretation of the merger notification obligation for dominant undertakings, thereby exacerbating the issues associated with this provision.
While certain stakeholders consider the existing system of collective redress in Switzerland to be sufficient, it seems possible that the unsuccessful outcome of Foundation for Consumer Protection lawsuits could revive the debate on the strengthening of collective redress in the Swiss legal system, particularly in the context of the ongoing revision of the Civil Procedure Code. In the longer term, this could also lead to a facilitation of collective redress in civil antitrust law, which is currently extremely challenging.
Under Swiss law, a proposed concentration triggers a mandatory pre-merger notification if one of the undertakings concerned has been held to be dominant, irrespective of the statutory turnover thresholds. It was previously unclear whether this criterion had to be met at the time of signing or at the time of closing. The Secretariat of the Swiss Competition Commission has now clarified this question.