Defendants should welcome the recent judgment in Fiscalink International Ltd v Yiu Yu Sum Alex, in which the court struck out the plaintiffs' claims against a majority of the defendants on the basis that the lack of progress over many years was an abuse of process such that the entire action against those defendants should be dismissed. The court's judgment is another example at first instance of a pragmatic application of the relevant principles concerning dismissal for abuse of process.
The High Court recently analysed the rationale behind the common law principle in Hollington v F Hewthorn & Co Ltd when determining the admissibility of parts of an earlier judgment of a Beijing court arising out of criminal proceedings. The court clarified that under Hong Kong common law, the Hollington principle did not prevent the courts from admitting factual evidence referred to in an earlier judgment of another court or tribunal.
A recent landmark judgment of the Court of Final Appeal confirms that in deciding whether it is fair and just to grant a protective costs order in public interest litigation, the courts should be apprised of an applicant's financial position. In the case of a corporate applicant, it is proper to inquire not only into the assets belonging to the company, but also other sources of funding to which it has access. The case is the first in Hong Kong in which the courts have extensively set out the relevant legal principles in this regard.
The High Court recently dismissed proceedings seeking to compel the Hospital Authority to disclose confidential patient records in connection with professional disciplinary proceedings. The decision serves as a good reminder of the tension that exists between the competing interests of preserving client (or patient) privacy rights and the necessity and public interest in the proper administration of professional disciplinary proceedings.
A recent case involved a contested dispute over the liquidators' access to certain documents stated to be in the respondent's possession or control. At first instance, the court refused to order the respondent to give wide-ranging production of documents to the liquidators on the basis that the documents sought did not fall within Section 221(3) of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance. This judgment was recently successfully appealed by the liquidators.
The Court of Appeal has held that a remarkably broad exclusion clause was not unreasonable within the framework of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. The judgment includes a discussion of various factors which the court will take into account when deciding such cases.
In a recent decision, the Court of Appeal set down a significant marker that so-called 'contractual estoppel' has no special status and is to be treated as just another form of exclusion of liability. In particular, it was ruled for the first time that any reliance on a contractual estoppel to seek to defend a claim for pre-contractual misrepresentation is an attempt to exclude liability which falls to be assessed for reasonableness under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.
The Court of Appeal recently provided helpful clarification on what constitutes 'knowledge' for the purposes of Section 14A of the Limitation Act 1980. The judgment reiterates that it is not when the claimant first knew they might have a claim for damages against the defendant that is relevant; rather, it is when they knew enough to make it reasonable to investigate further and, if necessary, obtain professional advice.
Freezing orders are a valuable weapon in the arsenal of parties seeking enforcement in England and Wales. However, they come with a heavy responsibility on the part of the applicant. If one gets it wrong, a great deal of time, effort, costs and tactical initiative are likely to be lost. The High Court recently provided helpful guidance as to which factors may be relevant when determining whether a freezing order should be discharged.
In a recent dispute about the existence of a contract, the High Court found that the parties intended to be bound only when all parties had signed. An open-ended duty to negotiate in good faith was void for uncertainty and the claim was struck out. This case is a useful reminder of several principles, including that an obligation to negotiate in good faith must be tightly drafted and time limited in order to be effective.