Parties which lose in arbitration often continue to fight off a claim before a state court in post-arbitral proceedings, despite not having a strong case. This provides a double benefit for Polish arbitration practice: not only are a vast majority of these attempts defeated, but the Supreme Court also has a chance to confirm its pro-arbitration approach. One recent decision underlines that the mere fact that the reasoning of an arbitral award is concise is insufficient grounds to vacate the award.
The Supreme Court has previously opted for both a broad and a narrow understanding of res iudicata in Polish arbitration law. In a recent judgment, the court again leaned towards a narrow understanding of to what degree an arbitral tribunal is bound by a previous award. The decision should be a caveat for all participants in the Polish legal market that they should play until the whistle is blown.
The arbitrability of corporate disputes has long been a controversial issue in Poland. Recent changes in Polish law introduced by the Act of 31 July 2019 aimed to resolve the issues surrounding and give the green light to arbitrating corporate disputes. Unfortunately, it seems that these amendments have failed to solve all of the problems and have even created additional uncertainties.
A recent Supreme Court case touched on the obligations of an arbitral tribunal which cannot base its award on party-appointed experts' opinions. In a controversial decision, the court clarified that in such cases, when both parties request a tribunal-appointed expert, the tribunal should allow such a motion and cannot merely decide against the motioning party, as this may cause it to violate its obligation to consider the case, which – according to the Supreme Court – is part of public policy.
It is obvious to arbitration practitioners that an arbitral award cannot deal with claims not brought before a particular tribunal. However, it is also clear that vacating an award due to a violation of public policy should be an exceptional measure. The Supreme Court recently dealt with these two principles and leaned towards the former, setting aside a domestic award granted for interest for a different period than the one demanded by the claimant in the proceedings.