A recent Limassol District Court decision serves as a useful reminder that the courts will rarely resort to public policy grounds for refusing the recognition of arbitral awards unless presented with cogent evidence. In addition, the courts are prepared to demonstrate the necessary flexibility dictated by modern commercial practices in examining the imperative requirements of Article IV of the New York Convention in a manner which will not hamper the convention's underlying objectives.
In a recent Limassol District Court case, the applicants applied to the court to set aside a Cypriot court order which had allowed the ex parte recognition and enforcement of a Dutch judgment pursuant to the EU Brussels Regulation or, alternatively, the recast EU Brussels Regulation. The applicants raised several arguments to support their application – in particular, the fact that the Netherlands judgment allowed for the registration and execution of the arbitral award only in the Netherlands.
The Supreme Court recently dismissed an appeal of a first-instance judgment which had applied the well-established principle that arbitral award registrations are a formality wherein district courts do not proceed to examine the merits or substance of the award. The Supreme Court rejected all of the appellant's arguments, dismissed the appeal in its entirety and endorsed the first-instance court's approach, which had been based on well-established case law.
The Supreme Court recently ruled that only part of a court judgment that had upheld an arbitrator's decision would be set aside. The appellants had raised a number of objections in their appeal, including that the summons to recognise and enforce the arbitral award had been filed improperly as the hearing had not been conducted in the same manner as a lawsuit, the parties had not agreed to refer the dispute to an arbitrator and the arbitrator had not had the legal authority to issue a mortgage disposal order.
In a recent Supreme Court case, the appellants appealed to the court to set aside or annul the first-instance court judgment which had upheld an arbitrator's decision. The Supreme Court agreed with the appellants' position on the matter and stated that the first-instance court had failed to deal with the examination of the legitimacy of the arbitration proceedings and the manner in which the arbitrator had conducted the proceedings.