We would like to ensure that you are still receiving content that you find useful – please confirm that you would like to continue to receive ILO newsletters.
30 January 2019
One of the highest profile public M&A transactions of 2018 was the competitive takeover battle between Comcast and Fox for control of Sky, against the backdrop of Disney's proposed merger with Fox. This article on the transaction looks at the auction rules that are used to determine final bids by competing bidders.(1)
As neither Comcast nor Fox had declared their bids as final by the relevant Takeover Code deadline (22 September 2018), the Takeover Panel supervised an auction process to determine the final offer prices. On conclusion of the auction process, Fox and Comcast had made final offers of £15.67 and £17.28 per Sky share, respectively, with Comcast's superior offer valuing Sky at approximately £30.6 billion.
As the first competitive process to proceed to an auction since the introduction of the default auction rules into Appendix 8 of the code on 1 January 2015, the auction for Sky has been watched closely by public M&A practitioners.
Rule 32.5 of the code provides that "if a competitive situation continues to exist in the later stages of the offer period, the Panel will normally require revised offers to be announced in accordance with an auction procedure", the terms of which it will determine and announce.
To expand the different aspects of this rule:
Historically, competing bidders have favoured agreeing bespoke rules (the exact details of which remain private), with the default auction rules serving as a framework on which a bespoke alternative can be based or as a contingency where the parties are unable to agree to an alternative.
The default auction rules provide for an open auction (ie, by public bids in the form of regulatory information service announcements to the market) between two competing bidders – where there are more than two bidders, the panel will modify the rules as appropriate.
There are also restrictions in the default auction rules on:
These are designed to ensure that the competitive situation is resolved in an orderly fashion.
In the offer for Sky, the interested parties (Comcast, Fox, Disney – as a concert party of Fox – and Sky) agreed to an alternative set of rules rather than the default auction rules, in which bids would be submitted in private to the panel over a single day and with only three rounds of bidding.
The key aspects of the alternative rules that were agreed were as follows:
To assist comparability between offers, each bidder was required to bid in cash only and, if Sky paid a dividend before the end of the offer period, to reduce its offer by an amount per share equal to the amount of the dividend per share. Further, on conclusion of the auction procedure, neither bidder was permitted to revise the price or nature of its offer unless a third party (excluding any concert party such as Disney) announced a firm intention to offer for Sky.
The Sky auction rules had broadly similar rules to those in the default auction rules prohibiting formula bids and restricting public statements. The Sky auction rules also did not require minimum increment increases, provided that the bid was higher than the last bid made by that party.
As an auction process involves a bidder revising its offer, following its conclusion a revised offer document drawn up in accordance with the code must be sent to the target shareholders (Rule 32.1(a)).
The panel has the discretion to set the deadline by which any such document must be published (Rule 32.5), and will also extend Day 60 in accordance with any auction process established by it in accordance with Rule 32.5 (Note 2 to Rule 31.6). This is necessary given the obvious difficulty in finalising, printing and distributing a revised offer document on or prior to Day 46 (as required by Rule 32.1(c)) if the auction process only starts on or shortly prior to Day 46.
For the Sky auction, the agreed rules provided that each bidder that made a revised offer had to publish a revised offer document on or before 27 September 2018 (the fifth day after the auction) and, regardless of when each document was published, the latest date on which either offer could become or be declared unconditional as to acceptances (Day 60) was set as 14 days from 27 September 2018 (11 October 2018). However, note that in the auction rules for Shell's and PTT Exploration's competing offers for Cove Energy, each bidder was required to publish its revised offer document on or before the seventh day following the auction and Day 60 was set as the 14th day after the latest date on which either bidder publishes its revised offer document.
It is possible that, if the target board consents, the lower bidder may be granted a dispensation by the panel from the requirement to publish a revised offer document (Note 1 to Rule 32.5). To avoid the confusion of multiple offer documents and forms of acceptance being sent to shareholders, the target board's consent would typically be expected in this scenario (unless, for example, the deliverability of the higher bidder was less certain than that of the lower bidder).
The discussion on the commencement of the auction process on Day 46 addresses the situation where both offers are being implemented by way of a contractual offer. However, if one or more of the competing offers is being implemented by way of a scheme, the panel must be consulted on the applicable timetable (Note 2 to Rule 32.5). This is because a scheme's timetable (which is agreed with the court) is not subject to the same timetabling requirements as a contractual offer, and there are no dates in a scheme which are directly equivalent to Day 46 and Day 60 of a contractual offer.
Although the panel should be consulted in all such occasions, in prior consultation papers and response statements the panel has indicated how it may approach such situations. Accordingly, where a contractual offer is made in competition with an existing scheme, the panel has commented that both bidders will normally be bound by the timetable set by the publication of the competing bidder's contractual offer document (ie, the auction process will normally commence on Day 46 of the reset timetable), and, where a scheme is proposed in competition with an existing contractual offer, the panel has said that the 14th day prior to the scheme shareholder meetings will normally be treated as the equivalent of the 46th day following the posting of the competing offer document.
However, the panel recognises that there may be situations where such an approach would be inappropriate – for example, if the scheme meetings are set at a date that is earlier than the first bidder's Day 60, it might be unfair to impose an auction procedure on a date that is earlier than Day 46 of the original bidder's timetable.
For further information on this topic please contact Will Pearce or Joseph Scrace at Davis Polk & Wardwell London LLP by telephone (+44 20 7418 1300) or email (firstname.lastname@example.org or email@example.com). The Davis Polk & Wardwell website can be accessed at www.davispolk.com.
(1) This article is part of a series on the transaction. For the previous article in the series, please see "Sky takeover – applying the chain principle".
The materials contained on this website are for general information purposes only and are subject to the disclaimer.
ILO is a premium online legal update service for major companies and law firms worldwide. In-house corporate counsel and other users of legal services, as well as law firm partners, qualify for a free subscription.